Purging Audit Data

When looking to implement something to purge the audit data after 90 days from some Oracle databases I found a nice blog post from Alex Gorbachev. The post provides a procedure for keeping X days of records in SYS.AUD$ and deleting anything older. It also provides an example for submitting a scheduled job via DBMS_SCHEDULER so that the purging of the data can be set up, and hopefully largely forgotten about.

I wanted to take this a little further and create a user specifically for the purpose of purging the SYS.AUD$ and most importantly I wanted the user to be locked down as much as possible. Here is what I came up with…


create user purge_aud identified by {appropriately complex password};
grant create session, create job, create procedure to purge_aud;


grant delete on sys.aud$ to purge_aud;
grant execute on sys.dbms_system to purge_aud;

I feel that I should explain why I didn’t just run all the above as SYS. Well, the logic is that if I have the parameter AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS set to TRUE, I believe is is wise to do this, then every command that is run as SYS will be logged in an audit file in AUDIT_FILE_DEST. I don’t want to create more audit data than I need to, so therefore try to limit the commands that I run as SYS. In this case the creation of a user and the granting of system privileges can be handled by SYSTEM – I can also see value in either having a user specifically to create new users or having individual accounts for the DBAs so that they can create users using an account that should only ever be used by a named individual.

Maybe I don’t need to point this out, but performing the object level grants as a user other than SYS would require me giving the same privilege I want to grant to PURGE_AUD to another user with the “WITH GRANT” option, which to me is not appropriate and doesn’t actually help. I would say that as a general rule I want the object owner to be the user granting the privileges on that object.

As I final note on this section, I have not named my user “PURGE_AUD” in reality on the basis that it would feel a little too obvious what the purpose of the user is and would potentially make it a target for the bad guys/girls!

The next step was to create the PURGE_AUDIT_TRAIL procedure in the schema of the PURGE_AUD user. I won’t repoduce Alex’s code here, but note that I used fully qualified object names, i.e. sys.aud$ and sys.dbms_system. Once the procedure was created I then scheduled the job as specified by Alex, but with the addition of “SYS.” before the schedule_name parameter and using 90 as the parameter value for PURGE_AUDIT_TRAIL. There would also be the option of creating synonyms, but I prefer to keep it simple and to me more objects in increased complexity.

At this point we have a user with pretty tight privileges and a scheduled job to run each day and clear out any audit data older than 90 days. I wanted to lock this user right down and remove any privileges that were no longer needed…


alter user purge_aud account lock;
revoke create session, create job, create procedure from purge_aud;

The above highlights something that I have the impression is often overlooked: A user might need a certain set of privileges when being “setup”, but it is highly likely that the user will not need that same set of privileges for its entire life.

The scheduled job is not impeded by revoking any of the above privileges and the job will continue to run each day in the “maintenance window”. In the unlikely event that anything needs to be changed it will simply be a case of granting the required privilege(s) to PURGE_AUD, making the change and then revoke the privilege(s) previously granted specifically for the change… A little extra work I admit, but I’d say a fair price for improved security.

It has been commented that auditors might not like the granting of execute on DBMS_SYSTEM to the PURGE_AUD user, but if that is the case for you then there is the option of not writing to the alert log and cutting this bit out of the PURGE_AUDIT_TRAIL procedure.

Finally, this maybe obvious to most readers, but the text will only be written to the alert log of the instance running the scheduled job in a RAC environment.